Only the refusal to listen guarantees one against being ensnared by the truth. How else are we to protect ourselves from continuing in error? It seems only fair to remind the reader that intellectual honesty has its dangers arguments read perhaps at first in curious fascination may come to convince and even to seem natural and intuitive. Moreover, I like to think, intellectual honesty demands that, occasionally at least, we go out of our way to confront strong arguments opposed to our views. But a view which differs from the readers’ cannot argue for itself merely by pointing out that the received view conflicts with it! Instead, it will have to subject the received view to the greatest intellectual testing and strain, via counterarguments, scrutiny of its presuppositions, and presentation of a range of possible situations where even its proponents are uncomfortable with its consequences.Įven the reader unconvinced by my arguments should find that, in the process of maintaining and supporting his view, he has clarified and deepened it. It is thought to be an objection to other views merely to point out that they conflict with the view which readers wish anyway to accept. Nevertheless, it may be that correctness in ethics is not found in what we naturally think.Ī codification of the received view or an explication of accepted principles need not use elaborate arguments. Though this makes for intellectual interest and excitement (I hope), some may feel that the truth about ethics and political philosophy is too serious and important to be obtained by such “flashy” tools. I write in the mode of much contemporary philosophical work in epistemology or metaphysics: there are elaborate arguments, claims rebutted by unlikely counterexamples, surprising theses, puzzles, abstract structural conditions, challenges to find another theory which fits a specified range of cases, startling conclusions, and so on.

I do not welcome the fact that most people I know and respect disagree with me, having outgrown the not wholly admirable pleasure of irritating or dumbfounding people by producing strong reasons to support positions they dislike or even detest. (Should I say that they enable me to see through the political realm?) Since many of the people who take a similar position are narrow and rigid, and filled, paradoxically, with resentment at other freer ways of being, my now having natural responses which fit the theory puts me in some bad company. Over time, I have grown accustomed to the views and their consequences, and I now see the political realm through them.

My earlier reluctance is not present in this volume, because it has disappeared. Thereby, I run the risk of offending doubly: for the position expounded, and for the fact that I produce reasons to support this position. Instead, it contains many of the considerations and arguments, which I present as forcefully as I can. This book contains little evidence of my earlier reluctance.

With reluctance, I found myself becoming convinced of (as they are now often called) libertarian views, due to various considerations and arguments. I know that reaction it was mine when I first began to consider such views. Two noteworthy implications are that the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others, or in order to prohibit activities to people for their own good or protection.ĭespite the fact that it is only coercive routes toward these goals that are excluded, while voluntary ones remain, many persons will reject our conclusions instantly, knowing they don’t want to believe anything so apparently callous toward the needs and suffering of others. Our main conclusions about the state are that a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified that any more extensive state will violate persons’ rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified and that the minimal state is inspiring as well as right. How much room do individual rights leave for the state? The nature of the state, its legitimate functions and its justifications, if any, is the central concern of this book a wide and diverse variety of topics intertwine in the course of our investigation. So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do. INDIVIDUALS have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights).

Utopia 2013